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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
CORPORATIONS, SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHT TO HAVE A DIVIDEND D4CLARD AND
PAID OuT ol SURPLuS.-In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Mich. Y919), 170,
N. W. 668, the questions were not new, and with one exception, the decision
was not unusual, but the sums involved were enormos. The Motor Company was incorporated in i9o3, under the general manufacturing incorporating
act of Michigan (P. A. 232, 1903), for the manufacture and sale of automobiles, motors and devices incident to their construction and operation, with
an authorized Capital Stock of $15o,ooo-$Ioo,ooo then paid up, $49,ooo in
cash, $4oooo in letters patent issued and applied for, and $1I,ooo in machinery
and contracts. In i908 the stock was increased to $,ooo,ooo by the declaration of a stock dividend of $i,9ooooo. Plaintiffs own one-tenth of the stock.
By July 31, 1916, the Company had sold xr272,986 cars at a profit of $I73,895,41 6 ; it had paid regular dividends of 5% monthly, 60% or $x,2ooooo per
annum on its capital stock of $2,oooooo, and in addition had paid special dividends of $i,oooooo in 1911; $4,000,000 in 1912; $I0,000,000 in 1913; $i,ooo,ooo in 1914; and $iS,oooooo in i9i5-$4rooo,ooo in five years. It had also
accumulated a: surplus in excess of Capital Stock of $14,745,095 in 1912; $28,124,173 in 1913; $48,829,032 in 1914; $59,135,770 in 1915; and $II,96o,90
o7 in
1916. Its assets were $132,o88,219; and liabilities, other than Capital Stock
and surplus, $18,127,312.
The selling price of the car was -originally fixed at $9oo.oo, but a policy of
-annually reducing this had been carried out until the price of $440 per car
had been reached in 19r4. This price was continued for the year 1915 in
.order to accumulate a larger surplus with which greatly to enlarge the Company's plant, and various investments for this purpose were made during the
year. Approximately Sooooo were sold this yeaf at the $440 price, and a net
profit of nearly $6ooooooo made. The directors then proposed.to reduce the
price to $36o per car, although there was a greater demand at the former
price than the Company could supply, and it was practically certain 6ooooo
cars, -nd with a like profit, could be sold during the year at the former price;
in which case the new price would cut the net profits some $48,ooo.ooo.
Plans were perfected in 1915-1916, and were about to be carried out for
substantially doubling the manufacturing plant at an estimated cost of $9,895,ooo for buildings, $5,i50,ooo for equipment, and $ni,325,ooo for the construction of a smelter plant to make the iron used in the construction of the
cars, the evidence showing that if this was done, the cost of the iron per car
could be reduced about fifty per cent.
Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the carrying out of these projects, and to
have a dividend of 5o% of the accumulated profits declared and paid to shareholders. They contended:-(i) That the statute limiting the amount of Capital Stock with which a manufacturing company could be incorporated to
$5o,ooo,ooo made it unlawful for a corporation to accumulate from profits,
and use in its business, more than $5o,oooooo, and the balance over that must
be distributed to shareholders. (2) That the building and operatio'n of the
smelter would be ultra Z,res. (3) Tliat the reduction of the price of the
car would make competition by others impossible, and thereby create a monopoly contrary to the anti-trust act; and, (4) That a failure to distribute a

NOTE AND COMMENT
large part of the surplus as a dividend to shareholders, by the directors, was
a breach of duty on their part.
The trial court held with the plaintiffs upon propositions (1), (2), and
(4), and ordered the distribution of one-half of the surplus (after deducting
the dividends already declared), as a special dividend to the shareholders,
amounting to $19,275,385. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court upon
all these propositions except (4), and held there was no monopoly created
contrary to the Anti-trust Law as alleged in proposition (3). In ruling as
the Supreme Court did upon the first three propositions, it followed substantially all the authority there is.
In affirming the decree of the lower court.on proposition (4), the court relied mainly upon facts which showed clearly that more cars could be sold at
the price of $44o than the Company could make, and that Mr. Ford exercised
a dominating influence over the business and had confessedly adopted an attitude toward the shareholders that, having already received great gains, they
should be content with them or their continuance; that the profits were too
large; and that by a reduction in the price, these profits should be shared
with the public.
C. J., "A business corporation is organized
The court says, OsTRAN,
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are
to be employed for that end.* The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of
profits among shareholders in order to devote them to other purposes." "It
is not within the lawful powers of 'a board of directors to shape and conduct
the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders,
and for the primary purpose of benefiting others." All the judges concurred
H.L.W.
in the result-

